CVE-2025-71127
wifi: mac80211: Discard Beacon frames to non-broadcast address
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: Discard Beacon frames to non-broadcast address Beacon frames are required to be sent to the broadcast address, see IEEE Std 802.11-2020, 11.1.3.1 ("The Address 1 field of the Beacon .. frame shall be set to the broadcast address"). A unicast Beacon frame might be used as a targeted attack to get one of the associated STAs to do something (e.g., using CSA to move it to another channel). As such, it is better have strict filtering for this on the received side and discard all Beacon frames that are sent to an unexpected address. This is even more important for cases where beacon protection is used. The current implementation in mac80211 is correctly discarding unicast Beacon frames if the Protected Frame bit in the Frame Control field is set to 0. However, if that bit is set to 1, the logic used for checking for configured BIGTK(s) does not actually work. If the driver does not have logic for dropping unicast Beacon frames with Protected Frame bit 1, these frames would be accepted in mac80211 processing as valid Beacon frames even though they are not protected. This would allow beacon protection to be bypassed. While the logic for checking beacon protection could be extended to cover this corner case, a more generic check for discard all Beacon frames based on A1=unicast address covers this without needing additional changes. Address all these issues by dropping received Beacon frames if they are sent to a non-broadcast address.
INFO
Published Date :
Jan. 14, 2026, 3:16 p.m.
Last Modified :
Jan. 14, 2026, 4:25 p.m.
Remotely Exploit :
No
Source :
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Affected Products
The following products are affected by CVE-2025-71127
vulnerability.
Even if cvefeed.io is aware of the exact versions of the
products
that
are
affected, the information is not represented in the table below.
No affected product recoded yet
Solution
- Apply kernel patches to fix beacon frame handling.
- Ensure beacon frames are sent to the broadcast address.
- Filter received beacon frames for unexpected addresses.
- Validate beacon protection mechanisms for unicast beacon frames.
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
Here, you will find a curated list of external links that provide in-depth
information, practical solutions, and valuable tools related to
CVE-2025-71127.
CWE - Common Weakness Enumeration
While CVE identifies
specific instances of vulnerabilities, CWE categorizes the common flaws or
weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities. CVE-2025-71127 is
associated with the following CWEs:
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC)
stores attack patterns, which are descriptions of the common attributes and
approaches employed by adversaries to exploit the CVE-2025-71127
weaknesses.
We scan GitHub repositories to detect new proof-of-concept exploits. Following list is a collection of public exploits and proof-of-concepts, which have been published on GitHub (sorted by the most recently updated).
Results are limited to the first 15 repositories due to potential performance issues.
The following list is the news that have been mention
CVE-2025-71127 vulnerability anywhere in the article.
The following table lists the changes that have been made to the
CVE-2025-71127 vulnerability over time.
Vulnerability history details can be useful for understanding the evolution of a vulnerability, and for identifying the most recent changes that may impact the vulnerability's severity, exploitability, or other characteristics.
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New CVE Received by 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Jan. 14, 2026
Action Type Old Value New Value Added Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: Discard Beacon frames to non-broadcast address Beacon frames are required to be sent to the broadcast address, see IEEE Std 802.11-2020, 11.1.3.1 ("The Address 1 field of the Beacon .. frame shall be set to the broadcast address"). A unicast Beacon frame might be used as a targeted attack to get one of the associated STAs to do something (e.g., using CSA to move it to another channel). As such, it is better have strict filtering for this on the received side and discard all Beacon frames that are sent to an unexpected address. This is even more important for cases where beacon protection is used. The current implementation in mac80211 is correctly discarding unicast Beacon frames if the Protected Frame bit in the Frame Control field is set to 0. However, if that bit is set to 1, the logic used for checking for configured BIGTK(s) does not actually work. If the driver does not have logic for dropping unicast Beacon frames with Protected Frame bit 1, these frames would be accepted in mac80211 processing as valid Beacon frames even though they are not protected. This would allow beacon protection to be bypassed. While the logic for checking beacon protection could be extended to cover this corner case, a more generic check for discard all Beacon frames based on A1=unicast address covers this without needing additional changes. Address all these issues by dropping received Beacon frames if they are sent to a non-broadcast address. Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/193d18f60588e95d62e0f82b6a53893e5f2f19f8 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e5bff40bb38741e40c33043ba0816fba5f93661 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b240a8935d554ad36a52c2c37c32039f9afaef2 Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88aab153d1528bc559292a12fb5105ee97528e1f Added Reference https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a21704df4024708be698fb3fd5830d5b113b70e0